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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between the size of local ethnic 
networks and immigrants’ likelihood of being self-employed in 11 
metropolitan areas in the U.S. I use American Community Survey data 
from 2005 to 2011. A two-stage discrete choice logistic specification 
models agents’ decisions to have a job or not, and if so, to work for wages 
or be self-employed. Generally, the likelihood of being self-employed 
decreases with network size, but the opposite holds true for salaried 
employment. I also interview self-employed Hmong in Saint Paul to 
explore the effect immigrants’ attitudes toward different employment 
options have on their work outcomes. 
 
E c o n o m i c s  S e n i o r  H o n o r s  T h e s i s  
 Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my adviser, Professor Karine Moe, for her extraordinary support 
this year, as well as Professor Sarah West, Professor Dianna Shandy, and Professor Gary 
Krueger. I would also like to thank the other honors students for their constructive 
comments; Pukitta Chunsuttiwat, for enthusiastically keeping me company; Emily 
Brinkman, for her tireless encouragement; and my parents, for cheering me on.    
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
II. THEORY .................................................................................................................................... 6 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................... 10 
A. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES ................................................ 10 
B. IMMIGRANTS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES .......................................................... 12 
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS ............................................................................... 14 
V. ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................. 17 
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ...................................................................................................... 19 
VII. CASE STUDY: SELF-EMPLOYED HMONG IN SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA ............. 22 
VIII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 26 
 
  
 I. Introduction 
In the United States, business ownership is an important aspect of the foreign-
born population’s role in economic growth. In 1990, immigrants made up 9 percent of the 
labor force and 12 percent of small business owners. In 2010, 16 percent of the labor 
force and 18 percent of small business owners were foreign-born (Fiscal Policy Institute 
Report, 2012). Foreign-born business ownership rates grow with immigrant share of the 
labor force, and business formation rates among immigrants follow the same general 
cycle as the national rate: rising in recessions and falling during periods of strong 
economic growth. Interestingly, there seemed to be an even greater movement of 
enterprise among immigrants than among natives during the Great Recession (Fairlie, 
2012). In 2010, the business formation rate per month among immigrants was 0.62 
percent (or 620 out of 100,000), compared to the U.S.-born 0.28 percent (or 280 out of 
100,000).  
Unsurprisingly, factors influencing business ownership among the foreign-born in 
the United States are a subject of interest among policymakers, academics, and business 
people alike. Various theories explain the “enterprising immigrant” narrative, 
emphasizing human capital characteristics (Borjas, 1986; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996); 
personal traits (McClelland, 1961); blocked mobility and labor market discrimination 
(Light, 1972; Light and Bonacich, 1998); family composition and social capital (Sanders 
and Nee, 1995), and access to financial capital (Bates, 1992) as primary determinants of 
immigrants’ employment outcomes. While more recent empirical literature demonstrates 
that informal search channels play an important role in employment outcomes (Ioannides 
 and Loury, 2004), few papers study the effect of social networks on immigrants’ specific 
decision to become self-employed and start a business.  
This paper examines the effect local social networks have on immigrants’ 
employment outcomes – specifically unemployment, salaried employment, and self-
employment. The umbrella term “self-employment” encompasses both small business 
owners and entrepreneurs. The former are freelancers, operating their own small business 
as opposed to working for an employer. On the other hand, entrepreneurs organize and 
operate businesses that often involve large financial risks. Although these individuals are 
engaged in significantly different kinds of self-employment, the American Community 
Survey – and consequently, my paper – does not make a distinction between the two. The 
terms “immigrant” and “foreign-born”, meaning anyone who was not a U.S. citizen when 
they were born, are interchangeable. These include refugees, asylees, and both 
documented and undocumented immigrants. Although it would be ideal to take the 
foreign-born community’s heterogeneity into account, existing individual-level datasets 
do not include details such as visa type. 
My empirical analysis shows that, in general, an increase in an immigrant’s 
network size slightly decreases her likelihood of being self-employed and increases her 
likelihood of working for wages. The network effect on the probability of a salaried or 
self-employed outcome is remarkably robust across different metropolitan statistical 
areas and specifications. I structure the rest of this paper as follows: section II outlines a 
theory of network effects on employment outcomes and my conceptual model. Section III 
reviews relevant empirical research, discussing estimation techniques and results. Section 
IV provides summary statistics. Sections V and VI follow with regression results and 
 robustness checks. Section VII contains samples of qualitative data I gathered for a case 
study that support my econometric estimates. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
self-employed Hmong in Saint Paul, Minnesota and provide some interpretation. Section 
VIII comments on this study’s limitations and outlines areas for improvement in future 
research. 
 
II. Theory  
Workers and employers both engage in a labor market characterized by 
information asymmetry (Stigler, 1962). Workers search for wage offers, and employers 
for job demands, until the marginal cost of search is equal to the expected marginal 
benefit. The larger the cost of search, the “less search will be undertaken” (101) by the 
job seeker at any given distribution of wage offers. The standard job search model, as 
outlined by Fitzgerald (1998), only provides individuals with two options – market 
employment and unemployment – without considering social networks or the alternative 
of self-employment. I outline a simple model wherein self-employment is considered 
alongside unemployment and market employment. This section is structured as follows: 
first, I describe the process by which workers transmit information via networks; and how 
network size affects the costs of job search, as well as the returns to both self-
employment and salaried employment. Then, I outline a worker’s two-stage optimization 
problem that determines her employment outcome. 
The individual’s optimization problem is to maximize the expected present value 
of her lifetime income, which can be expressed by  
   


 
where  is a discount factor from 0 to 1.  represents the individual’s income at time 	, 
and is a function of several variables, such as human capital characteristics (e.g. 
experience and education) and demographic characteristics (e.g. age and sex). Assuming 
there are three sectors (market employment, self-employment, and unemployment),  can 
be market wage 
, self-employed earnings 
, or unemployment benefits 
, 
depending on the individual’s employment outcome. Therefore, in this framework, 
individuals choose whether or not to work, and what kind of work to do i.e. market-
employment or self-employment, to maximize the expected value of their lifetime 
incomes.  
 Foreign-born agents can be “pushed” or “pulled” into self-employment for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary reasons. For example, the middleman-minority theory 
(Bonacich, 1973) suggests that ethnic groups face labor market discrimination, and are 
forced into self-employment to make a living. On the other hand, the ethnic enclave 
hypothesis (Bach and Portes, 1985) argues that immigrants enter self-employment 
because they have a comparative advantage in providing goods and services to other 
immigrants, especially those of the same ethnicity. Enterprising immigrants who exploit 
this comparative advantage might therefore receive large monetary rewards. Others still 
choose to be self-employed as a path to upward mobility (Light, 1972) or as a means to 
unobservable rewards, such as personal autonomy (Allen, 2000). Human capital also 
affects individuals’ employment choices: those who are not fluent in English are more 
(1) 
 likely to experience difficulties entering market employment and are therefore more 
likely to take the entrepreneurial path (Bates and Dunham, 1991).  
This paper estimates the specific effect social networks have on an immigrant’s 
choice to become self-employed. Contacts can act as sources of emotional and material 
support, especially in the form of financial capital or unpaid labor, for the enterprising 
immigrant. This reduces the monetary and psychological costs of being self-employed 
(Sanders and Nee, 1996). Social networks can also help a self-employed agent both form 
a customer base and promote her services, resulting in lower advertising costs. Therefore, 
the expected value of being self-employed is equal to the net wage 
, which is an 
increasing function of network size . A larger social network increases an agent’s 
expected value of self-employment by factor  where   0. 
  
,   
,  
Equation (2), gives the expected value of being self-employed. ws is self-employed wage 
and is a function of H and j. H represents a set of human capital characteristics that 
influence productivity, such as managerial skills and experience; and  quantifies the 
effect those characteristics have on an agent’s probability of entering self-employment. In 
the same vein, j is the contact network size and  measures the influence network size has 
on an individual’s decision to become self-employed. 
On the other hand, social networks also reduce the cost of finding wage work 
(Montgomery, 1991; Rees, 1996; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvo-Armengol 
and Jackson, 2006). Agents can receive offers both directly from a firm and indirectly 
through a contact in their social network. That is, contacts can act as additional sources of 
information about job vacancies for market employment. The expected value of being 
(2) 
 salaried is thus a function of both the probability of directly receiving an offer and the 
agent’s network size (Equation 3). This function is increasing in both variables – that is, 
as an agent’s network increases in size, the expected value of her market wage increases, 
and consequently, the probability of being market-employed increases as well.  
  
, ,   
, ,   
Equation (3) represents the expected value of an individual being market-employed, 
where 
 is her market wage and is a function of , H, and j.  is the probability of 
being directly offered a job; H represents a set of human capital characteristics that 
influence productivity, such as educational attainment and experience;  is network size; 
and  is the extent to which human capital affects her employment outcome. Similarly,   
is the extent to which network size influences the magnitude of , and thus the 
individual’s likelihood of being market-employed.  
At the beginning of the period, individual i is without work and considered 
unemployed. Individual i has a social network of size j and is offered a salaried job with 
probability a. i decides whether or not to hold a job for that period. If i chooses to not 
take a job for that period, she remains unemployed. If i chooses to take a job for that 
period, then she must decide what kind of work to engage in: self-employment or salaried 
employment (equation 4).  
E"  max& , ' 
Equations 5 and 6 below show that at each stage of the decision-making process, i 
chooses the option that maximizes the expected value of her earnings: 
max&", ("' 
Substituting equation (4) in equation (5) gives: 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
(3) 
 
 max&")max), **, ("' 
III. Literature Review 
A. Social networks and labor market outcomes 
Social networks have significant effects on individual employment prospects. 
Networks reduce job search friction, improve information transmission (Rees, 1996), and 
have a strong spatial component. That is, networks are likely to form within bound 
geographic areas such as neighborhoods or cities. Topa (2000) estimates Census tract 
spillover effects on spatial unemployment patterns in Chicago, and finds that in adjacent 
tracts, individuals with different ethnic ancestries are less likely to interact with each 
other than individuals of the same ethnicity. Moreover, the network effect is stronger in 
tracts with lower levels of education and higher fractions of non-whites. He hypothesizes 
that agents looking for low-skilled jobs are more likely to use informal search channels, 
i.e. their social network. Conversely, poorer and less educated individuals could be more 
geographically concentrated, and are thus more likely to share information about job 
opportunities. These results motivate further study of local social ties and their effects on 
different demographic communities’ employment outcomes. How can researchers isolate 
the network effect on employment outcomes, given other confounding variables? 
Conley and Topa (2002) extend this study and examine unemployment clustering 
in Chicago. They proxy agents’ social networks using 1) physical distance to each other’s 
tracts, 2) travel time between tracts, 3) differences in ethnic ancestries and 4) 
occupational distribution between tracts. They discover that the higher the employment 
rate in one’s network, the higher one’s probability of getting a job. Additionally, 
information sharing is more likely to happen between tracts with similar ethnic 
(6) 
 
 compositions. Although they make a case for analyzing these spatial patterns with a 
geographic unit smaller than the Census tract, data by block groups and blocks are 
difficult to find. In addition, their smaller sample sizes result in larger standard errors, 
making them more unreliable. Furthermore, while metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
are much larger areas than Census tracts or block groups, they are commonly treated as 
the geographical measure for social networks (Borjas, 1942; Borjas, 1994). 
Consequently, this paper also uses MSAs as the network proxy’s geographic unit of 
analysis.  
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2001, 2003) use a longitudinal dataset and find that 
in the short-run, agents embedded in larger networks experience competition effects. That 
is, network-connected individuals compete for jobs and information in the short run, 
resulting in a negative relationship between number of job contacts and probability of 
employment. In the long run, this result reverses; employment outcomes for connected 
agents are positively correlated. Therefore, I expect to see a positive relationship between 
network size and probability of having a job in the short-run, and the reverse in the long 
run.  
Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2001) examine the impact “a partial reliance on 
social networks as a method of job search has on labor market outcomes” (4). In this 
model, agents have other means of seeking employment, such as employment agencies, 
advertisements, etc. In smaller networks, the equilibrium unemployment rate falls with 
network size. Conversely, in larger networks, the equilibrium unemployment rate 
 increases with network size. There exists a critical network size1, above which the rise in 
job-search coordination failures exceeds the rise in individual job-acquisition rate. As a 
network increases in size, an unemployed agent is likely to hear about more job 
opportunities; conversely, after a certain point, information about multiple vacancies 
might reach the same individual, which is inefficient. These predictions match Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson’s (2003) because they too support the short-run competition 
hypothesis. 
 
B. Immigrants and labor market outcomes 
Two well-known hypotheses connecting immigration and self-employment are 1) 
the middleman-minority theory (Bonacich, 1973) and 2) the ethnic enclave hypothesis 
(Bach and Portes, 1985). The first suggests that ethnic groups facing discrimination in the 
labor market are forced into self-employment. In particular, those who are not fluent in 
English are more likely to take the entrepreneurial path (Bates and Dunham, 1991). This 
implies that migrants’ English-speaking skills are a significant factor in determining their 
labor market outcome. The second hypothesis argues that immigrants enter self-
employment because they have a comparative advantage in providing goods and services 
to other immigrants. Borjas’ (1986) research on immigrants’ self-employment experience 
documents the differences between self-employment propensities for immigrant and 
native-born men, and finds support for the enclave hypothesis.  
                                               
1
 The critical network size is uniquely determined as the value at which the change in the probability of 
being employed – given the current unemployment and vacancy rates – as the network size changes is 
equal to zero. 
   Yuengert (1993) uses a switching regression model of earnings to test three 
different hypotheses comparing immigrant and native self-employment rates, but finds 
little support for the enclave hypothesis. His results contradict Borjas’s (1986), who 
argues that enclave effects are a large contributing factor to immigrants’ self-employment 
decisions. Their results differ potentially because Borjas’s control sample is narrower. 
Yuengert also finds that self-employed immigrants compete with each other in the 
product market, and thus face depressed earnings. However, they might tolerate lower 
earnings in order to continue participating in the ethnic enclave community. These results 
further motivate my research on ethnic-based social ties and their effect on labor market 
outcomes.  
Beaman’s (2006) research offers insight into the specific intersection of resettled 
refugee networks and their employment decisions. Using a national refugee resettlement 
voluntary agency’s data from 2001 and 2005, she defines social networks as non-family 
reunification refugees resettled by the International Rescue Committee living in the same 
city2. An increase in the number of refugee arrivals of a given ethnicity for a given city 
results in a lower probability of employment for the cohort immediately following. On 
the other hand, an increase in the number of tenured refugees in an agent’s network 
results in better labor market outcomes for that agent. These results support the 
hypothesis of competition effects within migrant networks. Although Beaman’s paper 
examines how different facets of refugees’ networks impact the probability of their 
                                               
2
 Her data includes men only. Her controls are: command of English, educational attainment, religious 
affiliation (i.e. dummy variable for being Muslim), and IRC exception from employment. She finds that 
education variables are not jointly significant, but higher levels of English are positively correlated with 
employment status.  
 employment, it does not study how social networks’ affect their propensity to be self-
employed.  
The literature makes clear that social networks play a role in migrants’ labor 
market outcomes, but social networks have been defined and measured in a variety of 
ways. While the foreign-born population at large has been the subject of many studies, 
less research has been done on refugees – a subset of the migrant community – and their 
employment decisions. My paper attempts to paint a more holistic picture of the 
relationship between ethnic networks labor market outcomes by integrating both 
quantitative and qualitative data. I draw migrant data from the American Community 
Survey and create a social network proxy similar to Beaman’s (2006). I use a two-stage 
discrete-choice model instead of a linear probability model to distinguish 3 employment 
outcomes (self-employment, salaried employment, and unemployment or not in labor 
force) from each other. The next section provides my empirical specification, data 
sources, and summary statistics.  
 
IV. Data and Summary Statistics 
     How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? How do 
they affect their likelihood of being self-employed? Ideally, I would answer these 
questions using individual –level panel data with network sizes and employment 
outcomes of migrants from all over the United States over a long period of time. Since 
these data are not available to me, I estimate the network effect using American 
Community Survey data for 11 MSAs from 2005 to 2011. I restrict each MSA sample to 
include only prime age adults – that is, adults between 25 and 54 years of age only. Each 
 MSA sample contains between 7,000 and 135,000 observations. I adopt Beaman's (2006) 
network proxy of all prime age adults with the same ethnic ancestry living in the same 
metropolitan area. For example, if there are 86 Hmong living in Minneapolis-Saint Paul 
in 2005, then for each of them, their network size is equal to 86. My control variables are 
ethnic ancestry, age, age-squared (to proxy experience), educational attainment, marital 
status, household size3, how long the individual has been in the United States, whether or 
not the individual speaks English, and industry. I construct the length of stay control by 
differencing two American Community Survey variables: Census year (i.e. when the 
interview was conducted) and year of arrival. Thus, my econometric specification is: 
+,  - . ln 2+, . 34+, . 5,.6 . 7+, 
where  +, is the employment outcome for individual i of ethnic ancestry j living in 
metropolitan statistical area k at time t. If i is in the labor force, +, can represent 3 
employment outcomes: self-employment, salaried employment, and unemployment. This 
paper categorizes individuals as self-employed if they work in their own incorporated or 
unincorporated business, professional practice, or farm4. 2+, represents an individual’s 
social network size, and 4+, represents individual-specific control variables.  Finally, 5, 
and 6 are city and ethnic-group controls, respectively.  
I gather data for the following MSAs: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort 
Worth, Houston-Brazoria, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Miami-Hialeah, Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul, New York-Northeastern New Jersey, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C.5. Table 1 
compiles summary statistics on each MSA. New York-Northeastern New Jersey has the 
                                               
3
 Household size is not synonymous with family size. A family member not living in the surveyed 
individual’s household is not counted in this measure. 
4
 Taken from the American Community Survey questionnaire. 
5
 In the tables found in the appendix, I refer to MSAs by these respective codes: ATL, BOS, CHI, DAL, 
HOU, LAX, MIA, MSP, NYC, PHL, and WDC. 
 largest number of observations, followed by Los Angeles, Chicago, and then Washington 
D.C. (Figure 1). All individuals in my samples arrived between 1950 and 2011, and are 
between 25 and 54 years old. Ethnic networks range from 1 to over 9,000 individuals. 
The average household size in all 11 MSAs is between 3 and 4, even though the range 
extends to 20 household members. 
Figure 2 shows when migrants in these samples arrived in the United States. 
Common peak arrival years are 1980, 1990, and 2000. Los Angeles’ foreign-born arrivals 
peaked higher in 1980 and 1990 than in 2000. Conversely, Houston’s foreign-born 
arrivals peaked higher in 2000 than in either 1980 or 1990. Figure 3, 4, and 5 compare the 
migrant samples across MSAs by marital status, educational attainment, and command of 
English. The majority of migrants across MSAs are married with a spouse present. 
Boston has the highest proportion of foreign-born with more than 5 years of education 
(25 percent), compared to Los Angeles at 8.69 percent. Dallas has the largest percent of 
migrants who do not speak English (12.17 percent) followed by Houston (11.82 percent). 
The individuals in my samples identify with almost 200 different ethnic ancestries. 
Figure 6 displays the 10 most populous ethnic groups for each MSA. 
I hypothesize that having a larger local ethnic network in the United States leads 
to a higher probability of working for wages than being self-employed or unemployed. 
Table 2 summarizes employment outcomes; the average unemployment rate across all 
MSAs and all years is 4.85 percent. Figure 7 presents the general distribution of these 
employment outcomes. Most individuals work for wages or are salaried employees. In 
Boston, 70 percent of the surveyed individuals work for wages or a salary, compared to 
only 7 percent who identify as self-employed. Similarly, in Los Angeles, 62 percent of 
 the individuals work for wages, whereas only 10 percent are self-employed. The MSA 
with the lowest fraction of migrants who identify as self-employed is Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul at 6.75 percent, and the MSA with the highest is Miami-Hileah at 12.2 percent. 
 
V. Analysis 
I analyze the effect of migrants’ social networks on their employment outcomes 
beginning with a two-stage logit. In the first stage, I test the network effect on a migrant 
having job or not, conditional on being in the labor force6; having a job includes both 
salaried employment and self-employment. The second stage evaluates the network effect 
on the probability of either working for wages or being self-employed, conditional on 
having a job. Table 37 shows the magnitude, sign, and significance of the estimated 
network effect for all 11 MSAs. Boston’s network coefficients for the first-stage logit and 
second-stage salaried logit have the highest magnitudes out of all of the MSAs. A single-
individual increase in a migrant’s ethnic network in Boston increases the predicted log-
odds of her having a job by 0.000632. More specifically, that network increase is 
associated with a 0.000889 predicted log-odds increase in her finding salaried work. On 
the other hand, Philadelphia’s network coefficient for the second stage self-employed 
outcome has the highest magnitude of all the MSAs. 
The network coefficient on the probability of self-employment is small and 
negative for all MSAs but Los Angeles-Long Beach. Holding all other predictors 
constant, an increase in network size slightly decreases a migrant’s likelihood of being 
                                               
6
 This measure does not consider immigrants who are working but are not in the labor force (i.e. 
undocumented employment).  
7
 Coefficients on controls are not shown for brevity. The signs and statistical significance on all control 
coefficients align with previous literature. For example, being female is associated with a lower likelihood 
of salaried employment, but a less negative likelihood of self-employment across all MSAs.  
 self-employed. For example, in Philadelphia, a single-individual increase in a migrant’s 
ethnic network corresponds to a decrease of 0.00164 predicted log-odds of being self-
employed. The network estimates on self-employment for Atlanta, Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul, and Washington D.C. are statistically equal to zero; all of the other MSAs have 
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. On the other hand, the 
network coefficient on the probability of salaried employment is positive for all MSAs 
except for Los Angeles-Long Beach, and statistically significant at the 95 percent level 
for all MSAs except for Minneapolis-Saint Paul. It is plausible that all three estimates 
(i.e. the network effect on the three employment outcomes) for Minneapolis-Saint Paul 
are insignificant because it has a small sample size of less than 7,000 individuals. 
Los Angeles-Long Beach stands out as an exception, where the network effect is 
negative for salaried employment and positive for self-employment. As an MSA, it hosts 
the largest foreign-born population in the country. It could be that there exists a certain 
threshold immigrant population above which immigrants experience a within-network 
competition effect8. That is, below the threshold, a larger network generally increases an 
unemployed immigrant’s likelihood of finding salaried employment, because her contacts 
pass on information about job vacancies to her. As the network increases, she becomes 
one of many more recipients of that information, and the probability of her filling a 
particular vacancy decreases. 
Since log-odds are difficult to interpret, I provide coefficients on the marginal 
effect networks have on the probability of different employment outcomes in Table 4. 
                                               
8
 In order to account for this in my model, I try including a network-squared variable. There is no 
statistically significant difference when I add this variable to the initial specification, where network has a 
linear relationship with the log-odds of an employment outcome. Consequently, I do not include it in any of 
the tables. 
  
 These estimates tell us how the predictive margins of an outcome change if an 
individual’s network doubles (i.e. increases by 100 percent) and all other variables are 
fixed at the mean. A 100 percent increase in a migrant’s network in Chicago is associated 
with a 1.5 percent increase in the probability of being market-employed, and a 0.75 
percent decrease in the probability of being self-employed. On the other hand, a similar 
increase in a migrant’s network in Los Angeles-Long Beach is associated with a 0.51 
percent decrease in the probability of being market-employed and 0.39 percent in the 
probability of being self-employed. Again, all three estimates for Minneapolis-Saint Paul 
are statistically insignificant, ostensibly due to the small sample size. In general, an 
increase in network size is associated with an increased probability of having a salaried 
job and a decreased probability of being self-employed.  
Table 5 shows how well the two-stage logit predicted migrants’ employment 
outcomes. For the first-stage, it predicted above the naïve rule9 for all 11 MSAs. In the 
second-stage, the two-stage logit performed well predicting salaried employment for all 
11 MSAs. On the other hand, it was a poor predictor of self-employment for almost all 
MSAs except New York, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and Minneapolis-Saint Paul.  
 
VI. Robustness Checks 
The first robustness check is a two-stage probit, and Table 6 presents its results. The 
signs and significance of all MSAs except New York are remarkably robust compared to 
the two-stage logit estimates. Ethnic networks seem to have a consistently positive effect 
                                               
9
 The naïve rule is simply the percent of that sample that have a particular employment outcome. For 
example, in Boston, where 6.96 percent of prime-age foreign-born individuals are self-employed, the naïve 
rule for self-employment equals 6.96 percent. 
 
 on the probability of working for wages. Conversely, they seem to have a consistently 
negative effect on the probability of being self-employed. The negative effect on a 
salaried outcome and positive effect on a self-employed outcome in Los Angeles-Long 
Beach is significant at the 95 percent level in both the logit and probit models. 
 Table 7 and Figure 8 show the marginal estimates of network’s effect on labor 
market outcomes. The coefficients describe how the predictive margins of an 
employment outcome change with a 100 percent increase in network size, with all other 
variables fixed at the mean. In general, if a migrant’s network size doubles, they are more 
likely to have a job, and a salaried job at that. Once again, Los Angeles is the only 
exception to the trend at the 95 percent significance level. For the foreign-born in Los 
Angeles, a 100 percent increase in network is associated with a 0.5 percent decrease in 
the probability of salaried employment and a 0.39 percent increase in the probability of 
self-employment, on average. 
 Table 5 also shows how well the probit model predicted probabilities for different 
employment outcomes. It predicts over 95 percent of the first stage probit correctly for all 
11 MSAs, and over 85 percent of the second stage probit correctly for all MSAs except 
Houston (it only predicted 4 percent of the salaried outcomes accurately). For example, it 
predicts that 98 percent of New York’s self-employed immigrants are in fact self-
employed. On the other hand, it performs poorly for the self-employed outcome, with 
noticeably similar results as the logit predictions. The MSA with the highest predictions 
for the self-employed category is New York-Northeastern New Jersey at 45 percent. This 
means that the probit model predicts that only 45 percent of the self-employed 
immigrants in New York are self-employed. In summary, the two-stage probit and logit 
 models are very comparable. The logit model predicts salaried outcomes slightly better, 
but the probit model predicts self-employed outcomes slightly better. 
The second and third robustness checks are a multinomial logit10 and a 
multinomial probit. These coefficients in Table 8 and 9 show the probability of an 
individual choosing one out of many options based on individual-specific characteristics. 
For example, migrants living in Los Angeles experiencing an increased network also 
experience an increase in the log-odds of being self-employed relative to working for 
wages. This effect is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Conversely, a migrant 
in Atlanta experiencing an increased network size also experiences a decrease in the log-
odds of being self-employed relative to working for wages. In general, an increase in 
network size decreases the log-odds of being self-employed as opposed to being a 
salaried worker. 
Table 10 and 11 give the marginal effects of network size on employment 
outcome using multinomial logit and probit specifications respectively. With all other 
variables fixed at the mean, it is clear that an increase in network size generally increases 
the log-odds of being market-employed, and decreases the log-odds of being self-
employed. Network has an ambiguous effect on the log-odds of being unemployed. 
Figures 9 to 12 represent network’s marginal effects, using a multinomial logit, for 
migrants living in 4 out of the 11 MSAs: Los-Angeles-Long Beach, New York-
Northeastern New Jersey, Houston-Brazoria, and Minneapolis-Saint Paul. Figures 12 to 
15 represent the same effects, but using the two-stage logit. 
                                               
10
 The multinomial logit produces coefficients that are interpreted as the change in the log-odds of one 
outcome relative to some base outcome. Here, all regression results have their base outcome set as “Works 
for wages”. I can run these specifications as robustness checks because they do not fail the Irrelevance of 
Independent Alternatives assumption after using a Hausman test. 
 
 Finally, I run an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to test how well OLS 
predicts employment outcomes in Los Angeles. Table 20 shows that OLS predicts market 
employment and unemployment relatively well compared to the naïve rule, but 
performed poorly in predicting the other outcomes. These results suggest that discrete 
choice estimation techniques, such as nested or multinomial logit and probit, are more 
appropriate than OLS.  
 
VII. Case Study: Self-Employed Hmong in Saint Paul, Minnesota  
While the econometric estimates strongly suggest that local ethnic networks play 
a statistically significant role in migrants’ employment outcomes, I include a qualitative 
case study on resettled refugees for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between social networks and labor market decisions. Resettled refugees form a subset of 
the larger migrant community in the United States. Compared to self-selected migrants, 
refugees are behind in terms of “learning English, modifying their original skills, and 
finding out where and how those skills could be used to increase income” (Cafferty et al., 
1983, 356). I study the Hmong refugee population in Saint Paul to explore if and how the 
size of their local ethnic network influences their employment outcomes.  
The first wave of Hmong migrants arrived in the country as refugees from 
Vietnam and Laos in the mid 70s. The second wave was more spread out over the 2000s. 
Many of them initially settled in California, but several families later moved to 
Minnesota to reunite with their extended family and clan. According to the 2010 Census, 
Minnesota has the second-largest Hmong population in the country. The Twin Cities 
alone have 64,000 Hmong, compared to the 31,000 and 27,000 in the Fresno and 
 Sacramento metropolitan areas in California. This case study takes advantage of the fact 
that Minneapolis-Saint Paul hosts the largest metropolitan Hmong community in the 
United States. In addition, Hmong-owned and operated businesses are well represented in 
key commercial areas of Saint Paul, such as Rice Street and University Avenue (Kaplan, 
1997).  
The information that I present in this section comes from semi-structured 
interviews with 10 self-employed Hmong adults who were willing to share information 
about their personal and employment histories. I obtained IRB approval for the study. I 
first approached various stalls at the Hmongtown Marketplace in Saint Paul, and asked 
vendors if I could interview them for my research. After they gave consent, I asked open-
ended questions about factors that influenced their decision to enter and stay in self-
employment11. I had no existing relationship with any of the interviewees, and identified 
potential interviewees by how busy they seemed at the time. I conducted 10 interviews in 
English and took notes, but did not record the entirety of all conversations; all of these 
interviews took place at the window of or in the store. Since we were in an indoor 
marketplace, a few customers and other vendors were often present or in close proximity 
during the interviews.  
Several questions related to the vendor’s personal and family employment 
histories. One vendor responded, 
“We came to the United States in 1988 […] We lived in a really small 
town in California – it was hard to find work […] My dad used to be a 
chef at a restaurant […] but it was hard work […] Then, he and my mom 
                                               
11
 The schedule of interview questions can be found in the appendix. I did not ask every question at every 
interview.  
 had another job, but […] they got paid cash, so it was kind of under the 
table. My dad, he wanted to make money and not be tired all the time.” 
He made clear his parents’ desire for autonomy and a flexible working schedule. His 
family experienced difficulty entering the salaried labor market because of their low 
English-speaking skills. On the other hand, the language tie they held to the Hmong 
community impacted their decision to run their own business. He said that many of their 
Hmong customers feel “more comfortable if they can speak their own language” when 
negotiating prices – it made sense to do business with those who share your ethnic 
identity.  
His narrative reflects the broader literature on Hmong enterprise. When the 
Hmong first arrived, U.S. firms were unfamiliar with hiring individuals who had neither 
work histories nor English-speaking skills, and were thus unprepared to deal with the 
influx of Hmong seeking employment. Many Hmong experienced structural 
unemployment because American employers perceived hiring them as too risky (Taggart, 
1981). Consequently, small business ownership became a way for refugees to move out 
of dependence on public assistance to self-reliance (Fass, 1986). Some of the earliest 
Hmong ventures were sewing projects and small farming schemes. In the 1990s, Hmong 
businesses were grocery stores, as well as car repair shops or dealerships (Yang, 2001). 
By 2000, Hmong enterprise was relatively more concentrated in insurance sales, financial 
services, and real estate compared to other minority businesses in Minneapolis-Saint Paul 
(Toussaint-Comeau and Rhine, 2003).  
Dunnigan (1982) finds that Hmong businesses recruit primarily from a pool of 
“clan connections to the owner family” (128), as well as Hmong non-relatives. 
 Consequently, I was not surprised to hear many vendors mention the local Hmong 
network as a factor in their employment decisions. Hmong culture honors ethnic social 
ties, particularly those within a clan. Therefore, the large local Hmong community can be 
a labor pool, a strong customer base, or both for the self-employed Hmong. One vendor, 
who inherited the stall from his mother, said, 
“I would definitely say the Hmong community here in Saint Paul had a 
big impact on our business […] We cater to Hmong people because we 
know their preferences and […] we can offer better customer service. 
Friends and family are important too […] we give them discounts.” 
On the other hand, many stall-owners and operators emphasized economic 
independence over an ethnic network-based customer base as the primary motivation for 
being self-employed. A female stall-owner, who helped Hmong families file their taxes, 
described self-employment as a way to deal with the discrimination she experienced 
when doing wage work:  
“At my other job, some people got a raise easily […] no matter how hard I 
worked, I was unhappy with my wages. […] I like being my own boss – I 
decide how much I get paid, and it’s good.” 
Another vendor enjoyed owning his own store for more personal reasons. “Time 
flies,” he remarked, “You meet a lot of people.” He expressed distaste for 
working in a cubicle with little to no social interaction. 
Many interviewees seemed to find their work satisfying. One male shop-owner 
moved to the United States in 1990, and came to Minnesota in 2004. When I spoke with 
him, he had been selling CDs and DVDs for “almost 10 years”. “Working a business is 
 much better than working for a company, but sometimes [doing business] is hard,” he 
admitted. He felt concerned about the economy and how it would affect his business, but 
was quick to clarify that running his store was “still good [because] it’s flexible and 
relaxed.” The autonomy he experienced managing his own business seemed to 
compensate for its accompanying challenges. 
Based on my interviews, having a large local ethnic network is not necessarily a 
primary determinant for self-employment within the Hmong community. The individuals 
that I interviewed focused more on personal preferences for the level of autonomy and 
flexibility associated with that particular type of work. In addition, local refugee 
resettlement voluntary agencies, Hmong community organizations, and job training 
programs helped the Hmong in Saint Paul prepare for both salaried work and self-
employment. In the empirical section, the two-stage logit and probit regressions also saw 
statistically insignificant results for the network effect on employment outcomes for the 
foreign-born in Minneapolis-Saint Paul. Although these results cannot be extrapolated to 
all foreign-born individuals in the United States, they confirm other factors’ (e.g. fluency 
in English or length of stay in the United States) effect on employment decisions. My 
findings also reiterate the importance of including individual characteristics associated 
with enterprise, such as level of risk aversion or desire for independence.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
This paper presents empirical evidence that migrants’ networks have different 
effects, both in sign and magnitude, on employment outcomes depending on the MSA. 
As network size increases, migrants in the labor force are more likely to work for wages 
and less likely to be self-employed. These network effects, though small, are statistically 
 significant in most of the 11 MSAs. Ethnic networks do not necessarily play a large role 
in migrants’ decisions to become self-employed; if they do, their relationship is negative. 
Based on my interviews with Hmong business owners, preferences for autonomy and 
flexible hours seem to be more significant positive determinants of self-employment. The 
marginal network effect on the probability of a migrant working for wages is positive and 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level for 10 of the 11 tested MSAs. These results 
align with previous empirical literature, supporting the hypothesis that networks are 
associated with a higher likelihood of market employment for immigrants.  
The limited scope of this research paper bears several caveats worth mentioning. 
First, the structure of the ACS questionnaire does not allow me to easily separate 
documented foreign-born workers from the undocumented, so I consider documented 
immigrants in the labor force only. Since the estimates do not account for undocumented 
employment, they might be downward-biased – that is, the coefficients on network size 
might be smaller than they ought to be. Second, outcome-specific variables, such as the 
level of autonomy associated with that particular employment outcome, would have also 
been useful. In addition, since online platforms are growing increasingly relevant to 
networking and job searches, this research would benefit from controlling for individuals’ 
Internet access. 
While it would be ideal to include individual-level data on attitudes towards self-
employment in my specification, the American Community Survey does not record such 
information. Consequently, I acknowledge that my estimates might exhibit upward 
omitted variable bias. The semi-structured interviews with local self-employed Hmong 
shed light on some of these variables, and holds significant potential. However, my 
 analysis is raw and unsophisticated. Future improvements would include interviewing a 
larger, more representative sample of the self-employed Hmong population; recording 
and transcribing the conversations; and running those data through qualitative analysis 
software packages such as NVivo. 
Finally, American Community Survey data does not distinguish between different 
migrant groups, such as asylees, refugees, and economic immigrants. While including 
ethnic ancestry and year of arrival variables does partially control for group-specific 
characteristics, it is possible that my estimates do not reflect the true relationship between 
networks and employment outcomes. For examples, refugees might be less inclined to 
rely on their ethnic ties for employment opportunities because their resettlement agency 
is partially responsible for helping them find a job. The literature would benefit from a 
study that had data distinguishing different migrant groups to better isolate the network 
effect. Future research should also consider the effect local ethnic networks have on 
wages and wealth in foreign-born communities, and how to interpret discuss empirical 
results in terms of their economic significance. 
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 Table 1: Summary statistics for all metropolitan areas, all years 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Atlanta 
Female 25852 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Age 25852 38.54 8.13 25 54 
HH Size 25852 3.38 1.78 1 14 
Year of arrival 25852 1992.36 11.12 1950 2011 
Network size 25852 189.02 222.47 0 700 
              
       
Boston 
Female 25026 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 25026 39.30 8.28 25 54 
HH Size 25026 3.11 1.64 1 13 
Year of arrival 25026 1991.63 11.64 1951 2011 
Network size 25026 121.79 109.33 0 417 
              
       
Chicago 
Female 50555 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age 50555 39.49 8.24 25 54 
HH Size 50555 3.67 1.85 1 14 
Year of arrival 50555 1990.21 11.14 1951 2011 
Network size 50555 1056.83 1144.77 0 2646 
              
       
Dallas 
Female 41131 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Age 41131 38.64 8.00 25 54 
HH Size 41131 3.75 1.87 1 17 
Year of arrival 41131 1991.27 10.90 1950 2011 
Network size 41131 1252.37 1265.80 0 2906 
              
       
Houston 
Female 41450 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age 41450 39.19 8.10 25 54 
HH Size 41450 3.72 1.82 1 15 
Year of arrival 41450 1991.22 10.65 1950 2011 
Network size 41450 4087.13 4176.25 0 9666 
              
 
 
   
Table 1: Summary statistics for all metropolitan areas, all years 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Los Angeles 
Female 129426 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 129426 40.11 8.19 25 54 
HH Size 129426 3.82 2.07 1 20 
Year of arrival 129426 1988.63 10.36 1951 2011 
Network size 129426 78.49 432.80 0 5874 
              
       
Miami 
Female 39124 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 39124 40.99 8.13 25 54 
HH Size 39124 3.23 1.64 1 14 
Year of arrival 39124 1990.03 12.28 1952 2011 
Network size 39124 686.70 770.18 0 1970 
              
       
Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul 
Female 6551 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age 6551 37.96 8.05 25 54 
HH Size 6551 3.57 2.08 1 15 
Year of arrival 6551 1992.24 11.23 1952 2011 
Network size 6551 365.92 955.17 1 5874 
              
       
New York City 
Female 162754 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Age 162754 40.16 8.34 25 54 
HH Size 162754 3.41 1.81 1 19 
Year of arrival 162754 1990.57 11.00 1950 2011 
Network size 162754 935.11 763.55 1 2281 
              
       
Philadelphia 
Female 16537 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age 16537 39.84 8.33 25 54 
HH Size 16537 3.32 1.71 1 12 
Year of arrival 16537 1990.51 12.22 1951 2011 
Network size 16537 85.12 84.12 0 291 
              
 Table 1: Summary statistics for all metropolitan areas, all years 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Washington D.C. 
Female 44887 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 44887 39.40 8.22 25 54 
HH Size 44887 3.35 1.78 1 15 
Year of arrival 44887 1991.46 11.44 1951 2011 
Network size 44887 185.87 173.13 0 606 
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Table 3: Two-Stage Logit Estimates of Network Effect on Employment Outcomes, Conditional on Being in Labor Force 
                    
  First-Stage (Job or No Job) Second-Stage (Salaried or Not) First-Stage (Self-Employed or Not) 
MSA Magnitude Sign Significance Magnitude Sign Significance Magnitude Sign Significance 
Atlanta 0.0002998 (+) Significant 0.0003348 (+) Significant 0.0001845 (-) Insignificant 
Boston 0.0006315 (+) Significant 0.0008892 (+) Significant 0.0012059 (-) Significant 
Chicago 0.0000944 (+) Significant 0.0002136 (+) Significant 0.000391 (-) Significant 
Dallas 0.0000214 (+) Insignificant 0.0000418 (+) Significant 0.000054 (-) Significant 
Houston 0.00000126 (+) Insignificant 0.00000837 (+) Significant 0.000013 (-) Significant 
Los Angeles 0.0000449 (-) Significant 0.0000781 (-) Significant 0.000069 (+) Significant 
Miami 0.0000519 (+) Significant 0.0000798 (+) Significant 0.0000747 (-) Significant 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul 0.00000473 (+) Insignificant 0.0000168 (+) Insignificant 0.0016591 (-) Insignificant 
New York 0.00000128 (+) Significant 0.00000542 (+) Significant 0.0001321 (-) Significant 
Philadelphia 0.0000688 (-) Insignificant 0.0005572 (+) Significant 0.001641 (-) Significant 
Washington D.C. 0.0006071 (+) Significant 0.0005635 (+) Significant 0.0001681 (-) Insignificant 
 
*Significance calculated at 95 
percent level          
  
Table 2: Summary of Migrant Employment Outcomes for All MSAs 
            
 
ATL BOS CHI DAL HOU LAX MIA MSP NYC PHL WDC 
Self-employed 9.98 6.96 7.71 6.96 7.41 10.3 12.17 6.75 8.03 7.95 8.16 
Works for wages 66.04 69.59 66.92 69.59 68.3 62.3 63.09 82.8 65.5 66.33 72.78 
Unemployed 5.67 5.13 5.67 5.13 4.74 5.63 6.4 0.55 5.01 5.25 4.21 
Not in labor force 18.31 18.32 19.7 18.32 20.64 21.8 18.34 9.93 20.64 20.48 14.85 
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Table 4: Two-Stage Logit Estimates of Marginal Network Effect on Employment Outcomes (100 Percent Increase in Network Size) 
 
         
 
Job or not Salaried or not Self or not 
MSA Magnitude Sign P>|z| Magnitude Sign P>|z| Magnitude Sign P>|z| 
Atlanta 0.337 (+) 0.019 0.324 (+) 0.056 0.063 (+) 0.582 
Boston 0.792 (+) 0.000 0.792 (+) 0.000 0.549 (-) 0.000 
Chicago 0.654 (+) 0.000 1.536 (+) 0.000 0.755 (-) 0.000 
Dallas 0.313 (+) 0.002 0.508 (+) 0.000 0.145 (-) 0.037 
Houston 0.438 (+) 0.000 0.614 (+) 0.000 0.124 (-) 0.071 
Los Angeles 0.077 (-) 0.129 0.508 (-) 0.000 0.388 (+) 0.000 
Miami 0.440 (+) 0.000 1.369 (+) 0.000 0.823 (-) 0.000 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul 0.102 (+) 0.701 0.260 (+) 0.375 0.166 (-) 0.267 
New York 0.307 (+) 0.000 1.258 (+) 0.000 0.815 (-) 0.000 
Philadelphia 0.320 (+) 0.098 0.706 (+) 0.001 0.366 (-) 0.005 
Washington D.C. 0.578 (+) 0.000 0.740 (+) 0.000 0.094 (-) 0.24 
 
 
 Table 5: Predicted Hits and Misses for Two-Stage Logit and Probit 
          
    Probit Hits (%) Logit Hits (%) Naïve rule (%) 
ATL 
Employed or not 95.11 96.89 73.72 
Salaried or not 92.11 93.56 89.49 
Self-employed or not 0 0 10.51 
  
        
BOS 
Employed or not 96.55 98.06 76.55 
Salaried or not 94.07 95.72 90.91 
Self-employed or not 13.24 0 9.09 
  
        
CHI 
Employed or not 95.44 95.26 76.64 
Salaried or not 92.44 92.44 89.66 
Self-employed or not 0 0 10.34 
  
        
DAL 
Employed or not 95.06 95.06 73.72 
Salaried or not 92.18 92.18 89.49 
Self-employed or not 0 0 10.51 
  
        
HOU 
Employed or not 95.48 95.43 72.63 
Salaried or not 92.36 4.38 87.79 
Self-employed or not 3.9 3.04 12.21 
  
        
LAX 
Employed or not 96.08 96.05 72.83 
Salaried or not 91.88 92.13 86.16 
Self-employed or not 22.85 22.84 13.84 
          
MIA 
Employed or not 97.41 97.37 76.02 
Salaried or not 88.03 88.28 83.82 
Self-employed or not 0 0 16.18 
          
MSP 
Employed or not 97.1 97.98 76.59 
Salaried or not 95.71 96.6 92.46 
Self-employed or not 5.71 11.16 7.54 
  
        
NYC 
Employed or not 97.61 98.06 74.9 
Salaried or not 94.09 95.72 89.26 
Self-employed or not 45.01 12.82 10.74 
  
        
PHL 
Employed or not 95.14 95.14 74.28 
Salaried or not 90.36 90.36 89.3 
Self-employed or not 0 0 10.7 
  
        
WDC 
Employed or not 98.5 95.77 80.94 
Salaried or not 96.53 96.63 89.91 
Self-employed or not 0 0 10.09 
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*Significance calculated at 95 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Two-Stage Probit Estimates of Network Effect on Employment Outcomes 
  
  First-Stage (Job or No Job) Second-Stage (Salaried or Not) Second-Stage (Self-Employed or Not) 
MSA Magnitude Sign Significance Magnitude Sign Significance Magnitude Sign Significance 
Atlanta 0.0001825 (+) Significant 0.0002062 (+) Significant 0.0000985 (-) Insignificant 
Boston 0.0004701 (+) Significant 0.0006005 (+) Significant 0.0005159 (-) Significant 
Chicago 0.0000518 (+) Significant 0.0001269 (+) Significant 0.0001952 (-) Significant 
Dallas 0.0000168 (+) Significant 0.0000259 (+) Significant 0.0000251 (-) Significant 
Houston 0.00000132 (+) Insignificant 0.0000525 (+) Significant 0.0000061 (-) Significant 
Los Angeles 0.0000273 (-) Significant 0.000047 (-) Significant 0.0000396 (+) Significant 
Miami 0.0000286 (+) Significant 0.0000468 (+) Significant 0.0000413 (-) Significant 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul 0.0000166 (+) Insignificant 0.0000162 (+) Insignificant 0.0000172 (-) Insignificant 
New York 0.00000633 (-) Significant 0.0000269 (+) Significant 0.00000675 (-) Significant 
Philadelphia 0.00000354 (-) Insignificant 0.0003479 (+) Significant 0.0008322 (-) Significant 
Washington D.C. 0.0003544 (+) Significant 0.0003323 (+) Significant 0.0000866 (-) Insignificant 
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Table 7: Two-Stage Probit Estimates of Marginal Network Effect on Employment Outcomes (100 Percent Increase in 
Network Size) 
 
         
 
Job or not Salaried or not Self or not 
MSA Magnitude Sign P>|z| Magnitude Sign P>|z| Magnitude Sign P>|z| 
Atlanta 0.351 (+) 0.017 0.338 (+) 0.047 0.044 (+) 0.695 
Boston 0.270 (+) 0.066 0.819 (+) 0.000 0.546 (-) 0.000 
Chicago 0.658 (+) 0.000 1.549 (+) 0.000 0.778 (-) 0.000 
Dallas 0.346 (+) 0.001 0.513 (+) 0.000 0.141 (-) 0.043 
Houston 0.452 (+) 0.000 0.624 (+) 0.000 0.115 (-) 0.096 
Los Angeles 0.085 (-) 0.098 0.504 (-) 0.000 0.394 (+) 0.000 
Miami 0.446 (+) 0.000 1.358 (+) 0.000 0.836 (-) 0.000 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul 0.106 (+) 0.692 0.271 (+) 0.357 0.165 (-) 0.275 
New York 0.322 (+) 0.000 1.281 (+) 0.000 0.839 (-) 0.000 
Philadelphia 0.365 (+) 0.061 0.733 (+) 0.001 0.384 (-) 0.003 
Washington D.C. 0.608 (+) 0.000 0.744 (+) 0.000 0.100 (-) 0.211 
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit - Network Effect on Employment Outcomes (Individuals in the Labor Force Only) 
 
Self-employed 
 
Unemployed 
MSA Magnitude Sign Significance 
 
Magnitude Sign Significance 
Atlanta 0.000312 (-) Significant 
 
0.000368 (-) Significant 
Boston 0.0012044 (-) Significant 
 
0.0005118 (-) Insignificant 
Chicago 0.0004221 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000568 (-) Significant 
Dallas 0.0000648 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000446 (-) Insignificant 
Houston 0.000015 (-) Significant 
 
0.00000429 (-) Insignificant 
Los Angeles 0.000081 (+) Significant 
 
0.000018 (+) Insignificant 
Miami 0.0000856 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000519 (+) Insignificant 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul 0.0000438 (-) Insignificant 
 
0.0001612 (-) Insignificant 
New York 0.0001372 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000332 (+) Significant 
Philadelphia 0.0017491 (-) Significant 
 
0.0006941 (-) Insignificant 
Washington D.C. 0.0003396 (-) Significant 
 
0.0001562 (-) Insignificant 
* Base outcome is working for wages. Significance is measured at 95 percent level. 
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Table 9: Multinomial Probit - Network Effect on Employment Outcomes (Individuals in the Labor Force Only) 
 
Self-employed 
 
Unemployed 
MSA Magnitude Sign Significance 
 
Magnitude Sign Significance 
Atlanta 0.0002469 (-) Significant 
 
0.000269 (-) Significant 
Boston 0.0008587 (-) Significant 
 
0.0004162 (-) Significant 
Chicago 0.0002972 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000643 (-) Significant 
Dallas 0.0000444 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000369 (-) Significant 
Houston 0.0000105 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000039 (-) Insignificant 
Los Angeles 0.0000649 (+) Significant 
 
0.0000193 (+) Insignificant 
Miami 0.0000653 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000233 (+) Insignificant 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul 0.0000313 (-) Insignificant 
 
0.0000962 (-) Insignificant 
New York 0.0000938 (-) Significant 
 
0.0000128 (+) Significant 
Philadelphia 0.0012603 (-) Significant 
 
0.0005724 (-) Insignificant 
Washington D.C. 0.0002488 (-) Significant 
 
0.0001255 (-) Insignificant 
* Base outcome is working for wages. Significance is measured at 95 percent level. 
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Table 10: Multinomial logit - network's marginal effect on probability of employment outcome (ILF Only) 
     
 
ATL BOS CHI DAL HOU LAX MIA MSP NYC PHL WDC  
Self-employment (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
Market employment (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Unemployment (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) (-) 
Table 11: Multinomial probit - network's marginal effect on probability of employment outcome (ILF Only) 
     
 
ATL BOS CHI DAL HOU LAX MIA MSP NYC PHL WDC  
Self-employment (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
Market employment (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Unemployment (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) 
  
Table 12: Marginal effects of two-stage logit regressors 
on probability of employment outcomes (LAX) 
       
 Employed or not Salaried or not Self-employed or 
not 
 dy/dx    P>z    dy/dx    P>z    dy/dx   P>z     
       
Network size -3.98E-07 0.001 1.50E-06 0 -1.84E-06 0 
Female -0.24 0 -0.19 0 -0.058 0 
Age 0.019 0 0.0087 0 0.015 0 
Age-squared -0.00023 0 -0.00014 0 -0.00015 0 
       
Marital status       
Married, spouse absent 0.022 0 0.039 0 -0.014 0 
Separated 0.070 0 0.068 0 0.0050 0.3 
Divorced 0.074 0 0.068 0 0.0049 0.17 
Widowed 0.038 0 0.047 0 -0.0040 0.62 
Never married/single 0.029 0 0.044 0 -0.014 0 
       
HH size -0.0033 0 0.00025 0.72 -0.0042 0 
Year of arrival -0.0019 0 -0.0019 0 0.000036 0.71 
       
Educational attainment      
Nursery school to grade 4 0.051 0 0.042 0 0.011 0.086 
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 0.071 0 0.061 0 0.011 0.024 
Grade 9 0.080 0 0.061 0 0.019 0.001 
Grade 10 0.048 0 0.035 0.002 0.013 0.071 
Grade 11 0.031 0.004 0.029 0.011 0.00046 0.95 
Grade 12 0.087 0 0.078 0 0.0068 0.14 
1 year of college 0.11 0 0.10 0 0.0065 0.20 
2 years of college 0.13 0 0.14 0 -0.0051 0.36 
4 years of college 0.16 0 0.15 0 0.0066 0.19 
5+ years of college 0.18 0 0.16 0 0.016 0.004 
       
Speaks English       
Yes, speaks only English 0.076 0 0.071 0 0.012 0.004 
Yes, speaks very well 0.12 0 0.12 0 0.0054 0.12 
Yes, speaks well 0.088 0 0.082 0 0.017 0 
Yes, but not well 0.040 0 0.033 0 0.016 0 
       
Ethnic ancestry -0.000049 0 0.000013 0.058 -0.000051 0 
       
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base 
level.   
 Table 13: Marginal effects of two-stage logit regressors 
on probability of employment outcomes (NYC) 
       
 
Employed or 
not Salaried or not 
Self-employed 
or not 
 
dy/dx   P>z    dy/dx   P>z    dy/dx   P>z    
       Network size 2.29E-06 0.01 1.16E-05 0.00 -9.59E-06 0.00 
Female -1.62E-01 0.00 -1.12E-01 0.00 -4.95E-02 0.00 
Age 2.32E-02 0.00 1.15E-02 0.00 1.63E-02 0.00 
Age-squared -2.61E-04 0.00 -1.37E-04 0.00 -1.77E-04 0.00 
       Marital status 
     Married, spouse absent 2.83E-02 0.00 2.95E-02 0.00 -5.54E-04 0.88 
Separated 4.41E-02 0.00 4.27E-02 0.00 2.93E-03 0.53 
Divorced 5.30E-02 0.00 4.33E-02 0.00 9.93E-03 0.01 
Widowed 1.34E-02 0.27 1.22E-02 0.38 3.77E-03 0.67 
Never married/single 5.88E-04 0.88 1.42E-02 0.00 -1.38E-02 0.00 
       HH size -2.79E-03 0.00 -1.44E-03 0.12 -1.88E-03 0.00 
Year of arrival -2.79E-04 0.07 -3.92E-05 0.82 -2.37E-04 0.01 
       Educational attainment 
     Nursery school to grade 4 1.11E-02 0.55 4.03E-02 0.04 -2.65E-02 0.01 
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 7.91E-02 0.00 8.37E-02 0.00 -2.95E-03 0.68 
Grade 9 3.80E-02 0.01 4.35E-02 0.01 -5.41E-03 0.54 
Grade 10 2.39E-02 0.11 3.21E-02 0.04 -9.05E-03 0.29 
Grade 11 3.96E-02 0.01 4.78E-02 0.00 -8.22E-03 0.35 
Grade 12 1.06E-01 0.00 1.07E-01 0.00 2.27E-05 1.00 
1 year of college 1.38E-01 0.00 1.37E-01 0.00 2.84E-04 0.97 
2 years of college 1.82E-01 0.00 2.04E-01 0.00 -2.13E-02 0.00 
4 years of college 1.91E-01 0.00 1.99E-01 0.00 -7.22E-03 0.29 
5+ years of college 2.29E-01 0.00 2.32E-01 0.00 -5.08E-03 0.47 
       Speaks English 
     Yes, speaks only English 1.06E-01 0.00 1.07E-01 0.00 3.99E-03 0.38 
Yes, speaks very well 9.90E-02 0.00 9.74E-02 0.00 7.64E-03 0.10 
Yes, speaks well 6.78E-02 0.00 5.91E-02 0.00 1.47E-02 0.00 
Yes, but not well 3.33E-02 0.00 2.42E-02 0.00 1.41E-02 0.00 
       Ethnic ancestry -1.66E-05 0.01 -1.05E-05 0.12 -5.66E-06 0.15 
       Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base 
level.   
 Table 14: Marginal effects of two-stage logit regressors 
on probability of employment outcomes (HOU) 
       
 
Employed or 
not Salaried or not 
Self-employed 
or not 
 
dy/dx   P>z    dy/dx   P>z    dy/dx   P>z    
       Network size -2.91E-06 0.00 -1.26E-06 0.06 -1.71E-06 0.00 
Female -3.20E-01 0.00 -2.73E-01 0.00 -4.68E-02 0.00 
Age 1.90E-02 0.00 8.63E-03 0.00 1.42E-02 0.00 
Age-squared -2.27E-04 0.00 -1.18E-04 0.00 -1.54E-04 0.00 
       
Marital status 
     Married, spouse absent 1.54E-02 0.11 2.21E-02 0.04 4.56E-04 0.94 
Separated 1.19E-01 0.00 9.87E-02 0.00 3.06E-02 0.00 
Divorced 1.18E-01 0.00 9.80E-02 0.00 2.29E-02 0.00 
Widowed 9.41E-02 0.00 7.24E-02 0.00 4.02E-02 0.02 
Never married/single 4.62E-02 0.00 5.37E-02 0.00 -2.16E-03 0.63 
       HH size -8.06E-03 0.00 -7.36E-03 0.00 -5.16E-04 0.56 
Year of arrival -3.04E-03 0.00 -1.98E-03 0.00 -9.37E-04 0.00 
       
Educational attainment 
     Nursery school to grade 4 4.07E-02 0.01 3.92E-02 0.02 6.03E-04 0.96 
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 3.54E-02 0.01 3.89E-02 0.01 -5.67E-03 0.52 
Grade 9 2.58E-02 0.07 2.85E-02 0.07 -6.53E-03 0.50 
Grade 10 3.84E-02 0.03 2.15E-02 0.27 1.63E-02 0.20 
Grade 11 -3.97E-03 0.83 -1.14E-02 0.58 4.34E-03 0.73 
Grade 12 4.39E-02 0.00 3.73E-02 0.01 3.92E-03 0.65 
1 year of college 6.18E-02 0.00 6.61E-02 0.00 -7.23E-03 0.45 
2 years of college 7.01E-02 0.00 8.36E-02 0.00 -1.54E-02 0.14 
4 years of college 9.28E-02 0.00 1.17E-01 0.00 -2.62E-02 0.00 
5+ years of college 1.36E-01 0.00 1.40E-01 0.00 -1.20E-02 0.20 
       Speaks English 
     Yes, speaks only English 7.78E-02 0.00 1.05E-01 0.00 -1.24E-02 0.05 
Yes, speaks very well 1.10E-01 0.00 1.15E-01 0.00 7.09E-03 0.22 
Yes, speaks well 8.12E-02 0.00 7.08E-02 0.00 2.38E-02 0.00 
Yes, but not well 5.94E-02 0.00 5.36E-02 0.00 1.79E-02 0.00 
       Ethnic ancestry 1.17E-05 0.27 4.26E-06 0.72 5.90E-06 0.41 
       Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base  
  
   
Table 15: Marginal effects of two-stage logit regressors on probability of 
employment outcomes (MSP) 
       
 
Employed or 
not Salaried or not 
Self-employed 
or not 
 
dy/dx   P>z    dy/dx   P>z    dy/dx   P>z    
       Network size 7.68E-07 0.91 3.28E-06 0.63 -3.29E-06 0.30 
Female -1.37E-01 0.00 -1.05E-01 0.00 -3.16E-02 0.00 
Age 1.02E-02 0.13 7.12E-03 0.34 1.04E-02 0.02 
Age-squared -1.36E-04 0.11 -1.29E-04 0.17 -9.55E-05 0.09 
       Marital status 
     Married, spouse absent 9.71E-03 0.72 2.77E-02 0.36 -1.51E-02 0.36 
Separated 3.70E-02 0.24 6.47E-02 0.07 -2.34E-02 0.25 
Divorced 3.08E-02 0.13 5.04E-02 0.03 -1.83E-02 0.12 
Widowed -9.01E-02 0.18 -1.28E-01 0.10 3.14E-02 0.51 
Never married/single -4.25E-02 0.01 -1.64E-02 0.38 -2.60E-02 0.01 
       HH size -2.58E-03 0.40 -5.95E-03 0.08 3.31E-03 0.08 
Year of arrival -2.11E-03 0.00 -1.67E-03 0.01 -2.67E-04 0.40 
       Educational attainment 
     Nursery school to grade 4 2.75E-02 0.70 6.53E-02 0.39 . 
 Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 1.11E-01 0.01 1.32E-01 0.00 -1.82E-02 0.38 
Grade 9 1.02E-01 0.08 1.10E-01 0.08 2.26E-04 0.99 
Grade 10 3.72E-02 0.55 5.00E-02 0.45 -6.36E-03 0.83 
Grade 11 -2.82E-02 0.68 -5.96E-02 0.41 4.25E-02 0.31 
Grade 12 1.11E-01 0.00 9.38E-02 0.01 2.91E-02 0.10 
1 year of college 1.31E-01 0.00 1.06E-01 0.01 3.52E-02 0.07 
2 years of college 1.79E-01 0.00 1.69E-01 0.00 2.01E-02 0.32 
4 years of college 1.31E-01 0.00 1.39E-01 0.00 1.44E-03 0.94 
5+ years of college 1.71E-01 0.00 1.75E-01 0.00 4.83E-03 0.79 
       Speaks English 
     Yes, speaks only English 2.12E-01 0.00 1.84E-01 0.00 4.82E-02 0.00 
Yes, speaks very well 1.98E-01 0.00 1.79E-01 0.00 4.45E-02 0.00 
Yes, speaks well 1.57E-01 0.00 1.27E-01 0.01 5.30E-02 0.00 
Yes, but not well 7.30E-02 0.10 5.33E-02 0.26 3.75E-02 0.02 
       Ethnic ancestry -3.81E-05 0.10 1.83E-05 0.46 -5.11E-05 0.00 
       Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base 
level.   
 Table 16: Marginal effects of network in two-stage logit on probability of 
employed outcomes (LAX) 
       
 Job or not Salaried or not Self-employed or not 
 Margin P>z Margin P>z Margin P>z 
       
Every 1500 people      
1 0.73 0 0.61 0 0.13 0 
2 0.73 0 0.61 0 0.12 0 
3 0.73 0 0.61 0 0.12 0 
4 0.73 0 0.61 0 0.12 0 
5 0.73 0 0.61 0 0.11 0 
6 0.73 0 0.62 0 0.11 0 
7 0.73 0 0.62 0 0.11 0 
8 0.73 0 0.62 0 0.10 0 
9 0.73 0 0.62 0 0.10 0 
10 0.73 0 0.63 0 0.10 0 
11 0.73 0 0.63 0 0.10 0 
12 0.73 0 0.63 0 0.09 0 
13 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.09 0 
14 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.09 0 
15 0.72 0 0.64 0 0.09 0 
16 0.72 0 0.64 0 0.08 0 
17 0.72 0 0.64 0 0.08 0 
18 0.72 0 0.64 0 0.08 0 
19 0.72 0 0.65 0 0.08 0 
20 0.72 0 0.65 0 0.08 0 
21 0.72 0 0.65 0 0.07 0 
 
 
 Table 17: Marginal effects of network in two-stage logit on probability of 
employed outcomes (NYC) 
       
 Job or not Salaried or not Self-employed 
or not 
 Margin P>z Margin P>z Margin P>z 
       
Every 500 people       
1 0.73 0 0.63 0 0.10 0 
2 0.74 0 0.64 0 0.095 0 
3 0.74 0 0.65 0 0.090 0 
4 0.74 0 0.65 0 0.085 0 
5 0.74 0 0.66 0 0.080 0 
6 0.74 0 0.66 0 0.075 0 
7 0.74 0 0.67 0 0.071 0 
8 0.74 0 0.67 0 0.067 0 
9 0.74 0 0.68 0 0.063 0 
10 0.74 0 0.69 0 0.059 0 
11 0.75 0 0.69 0 0.055 0 
12 0.75 0 0.70 0 0.052 0 
13 0.75 0 0.70 0 0.049 0 
 Table 18: Marginal effects of network in two-stage logit on probability of 
employed outcomes (HOU) 
       
 Job or not Salaried or not Self-employed 
or not 
 Margin P>z Margin P>z Margin P>z 
       
Every 500 people       
1 0.74 0 0.64 0 0.097 0 
2 0.74 0 0.64 0 0.096 0 
3 0.74 0 0.64 0 0.095 0 
4 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.095 0 
5 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.094 0 
6 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.093 0 
7 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.092 0 
8 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.091 0 
9 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.090 0 
10 0.73 0 0.64 0 0.089 0 
11 0.72 0 0.64 0 0.088 0 
12 0.72 0 0.64 0 0.088 0 
13 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.087 0 
14 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.086 0 
15 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.085 0 
16 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.084 0 
17 0.72 0 0.63 0 0.083 0 
18 0.71 0 0.63 0 0.083 0 
19 0.71 0 0.63 0 0.082 0 
20 0.71 0 0.63 0 0.081 0 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20: Predicted Hits for OLS (LAX) 
   
 Hit (%) Naïve rule (%) 
Self-employed 0 10.3 
Works for wages/salary 64.8 62.3 
Unemployed 43.4 5.62 
Not in labor force 0 21.8 
Table 19: Marginal effects of network in two-stage logit on probability of 
employed outcomes (MSP) 
       
 Job or not Salaried or not Self-employed or 
not 
 Margin P>z Margin P>z Margin P>z 
       
Every 500 people       
1 0.77 0 0.70 0 0.065 0.065 
2 0.77 0 0.71 0 0.063 0.063 
3 0.77 0 0.71 0 0.062 0.062 
4 0.77 0 0.71 0 0.060 0.060 
5 0.77 0 0.71 0 0.059 0.059 
6 0.77 0 0.71 0 0.057 0.057 
7 0.77 0 0.71 0 0.056 0.056 
8 0.77 0 0.72 0 0.054 0.054 
9 0.77 0 0.72 0 0.053 0.053 
10 0.77 0 0.72 0 0.051 0.051 
11 0.77 0 0.72 0 0.050 0.050 
12 0.77 0 0.72 0 0.049 0.049 
 Schedule of Interview Questions 
 
• When did you arrive in the U.S.? What country did you leave? 
• Where did you live when you first arrived? When did you move here? 
• What was the highest grade you completed? 
• What language do you speak at home? How would you rate your command of 
English (written/reading/spoken)? 
• How would you describe the demographic composition of your neighborhood? 
• Can you tell me more about what it was like trying to find a job here when you 
first arrived? How did you go about looking for employment? 
• What kinds of organizations reached out to you?  
• What kinds of resources did they provide? Which ones did you use or find most 
helpful? 
• How does owning/operating your own business compare to working a 
salaried/wage-rate job? 
• What do you enjoy about owning/operating your own business? 
• What are some of the challenges of running your own business?   
• Can you tell me more about the kind of hours that you work? 
• What kind of work did you do before starting [insert business/organization 
name]? What companies did you work for? 
• What factors did you consider when deciding to start [insert business/organization 
name]?  
• When did you officially start operating [insert business/organization name]? 
• How much did it cost to start [insert business/organization name]? 
• Tell me about how you gathered the capital and resources to get [insert 
business/organization name] off the ground. 
• Before you decided to become self-employed, whom did you discuss your 
ideas/plans with? 
• How did you meet these people (referring to response to previous question)? 
• How would you describe your relationship with them (e.g. friends, acquaintances, 
colleagues, neighbors)? 
• How would you describe the demographic composition of your social networks 
(i.e. friends, colleagues, fellow churchgoers, neighbors, etc.)? What role did they 
play in your decision to become self-employed? 
• How would you describe your ties with the local Hmong community? 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Comparing MSA sample sizes, all years 
 
 
Figure 2: Histogram and kernel density plot of year of arrival for all MSAs 
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 Figure 3: Marital status
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Pe
rc
en
t o
f M
SA
 
sa
m
pl
e
 as percent of MSA sample by MSA 
Never married/single
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Married, spouse absent
Married, spouse present
  
 
How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment 
 
Figure 4: Educational attainment 
 
 
 
Figure 5: English-speaking ability as percent of MSA sample by MSA
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How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? 
 
  
Figure 6: Top 10 ethnic ancestries for all years by MSA 
  
 
How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? 
 
  
Figure 6 [continued]: Top 10 ethnic ancestries for all years by MSA 
 
 
  
 
How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of
 
 
Figure 8: Two-Stage Probit
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How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? 
 
  
Figure 9: Network’s marginal effect on probability of employment outcomes in LAX 
(From top-left to bottom-right: self-employment, salaried employment, unemployment, 
and not in labor force – respectively)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcomes in New York-NJ 
(From top-left to bottom-right: self-employment, salaried employment, unemployment, 
and not in labor force – respectively)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? 
 
  
Figure 11: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcomes in Houston-
Brazoria 
(From top-left to bottom-right: self-employment, salaried employment, unemployment, 
and not in labor force – respectively)  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcomes in Minneapolis-
Saint Paul 
From top-left to bottom-right: self-employment, salaried employment, unemployment, 
and not in labor force – respectively  
 
 
 
  
 
How do migrants’ social networks influence their employment outcomes? 
 
  
Figure 13: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcome using two-stage logit 
(HOU) 
 
 
Figure 14: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcome using two-stage logit 
(NYC) 
 
Figure 15: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcome using two-stage logit 
(LAX) 
 
 
Figure 16: Network’s marginal effects on employment outcome using two-stage logit 
(MSP)  
